The battle of Smolensk is brief. Smolensk battle during the Great Patriotic War, its course and significance Time of the Smolensk battle
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The tragedy of 1941. Causes of the disaster [anthology] Morozov Andrey Sergeevich
D. E. Komarov UNKNOWN BATTLE OF SMOLENSK
D. E. Komarov
UNKNOWN BATTLE OF SMOLENSK
In modern historical science and society, there has recently been an increased interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War. There are many scientific and journalistic works considering various episodes of that war. However, it should be noted that various pages of the Great Patriotic War are now being studied far from being equally. Against the background of increased attention to the events in the Leningrad direction, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the Vyazemsky encirclement, the problems of the Smolensk battle are practically not being developed. The degree of scientific study and understanding of this colossal battle in terms of its scale and consequences is still at the level of the early 80s. the last century. Suffice it to say that in the national historiography there is no monographic study devoted to this most important event of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Such "inattention", both on the part of official science and independent modern researchers, is difficult to explain. Most likely, the attention of researchers is primarily attracted by the so-called "white spots", and the Battle of Smolensk, "about which so much has been written," is considered a worked-out topic. However, this is not the case. The battle of Smolensk is far from an unambiguous and controversial page of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind.
The Smolensk region, where the main events of the battle unfolded, was not a border region, but already three weeks after the start of the war, hostilities were taking place on its territory. The enemy offensive developed rapidly. Parts of the Red Army, resisting the enemy, retreated. At the end of June, fighting was already going on in the area of the old border. On June 26, German troops occupied Minsk, on June 30 they entered Lvov. In the first 15-18 days of the war, the enemy troops advanced in the North-West direction to a depth of up to 450 km; in the West - by 450–600 km; in the South-West - up to 350 km. Parts of the Red Army suffered huge losses.
The Nazi command considered the central direction - the Moscow direction - to be the main direction of the offensive. It was here that the enemy concentrated his main forces. Of the total number of manpower and equipment concentrated to attack the USSR, Army Group Center included 40.2% of all divisions (including 48.2% of motorized and 52.9% of tank divisions) and the largest Luftwaffe air fleet. They comprised 36% of the total personnel, 53% of tanks, 41% of guns and mortars, and 43% of aircraft deployed from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea. Parts of this group were to carry out a double envelopment of the troops of the Western District located in the Belostok ledge, and after their destruction, develop an offensive against Smolensk and Moscow. The main blow of the Nazi troops passed through the territory of the Smolensk region. It was here that a grandiose confrontation of the opposing forces unfolded on the central sector of the front in the initial period of the war, which went down in history as the Battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941).
The battle of Smolensk is the first major defensive operation of the initial period of the war, in which the advance of the enemy was stopped for two months. The enemy suffered significant losses, and in some areas was forced to retreat (the Yelninskaya offensive operation). If failures in border battles with the enemy could be justified to a certain extent by the fact of surprise, unpreparedness, then the Smolensk battle developed in completely different conditions. There is no longer any need to talk about surprise, the main plans of the enemy and the tactics of the enemy troops were clearly identified, the country turned on its mobilization, political and economic resources at full capacity, units and formations were pulled up from the rear areas, a great patriotic upsurge reigned in society.
The battle of Smolensk was a complex complex of interconnected offensive and defensive actions of the Soviet troops on a huge front section of 650 km and up to 250 km deep. This battle spread to the territory of Smolensk and nearby regions. Units and formations of four Soviet fronts - Western, Reserve, Central and Bryansk - took part in it. The main direction where the main hostilities unfolded was the Smolensk-Moscow direction, and the center of our defense was the city of Smolensk. Due to geographical features, this area received the code name "Smolensk Gates" (the interfluve of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper). It was the possession of these "gates" that opened the way to Moscow.
The successes of the enemy in breaking through the state border and in Belarus in the first two weeks of the war instilled in the German command confidence that there were no reserves in the rear of the Western Front that could offer serious resistance on the way to Moscow. After the defeat near Minsk, our troops retreated to Mogilev and Zhlobin, and on the Soviet-German front, a “gap” formed on the Sebezh-Mogilev sector, where the troops of Army Group Center aimed their strike. The commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, determined the forces of the Western Front in the Smolensk-Moscow direction in just 11 divisions. In this regard, the German command considered the defeat of parts of the Western Front as a fait accompli and planned further actions. On June 30, Chief of the General Staff Halder noted: “When we force the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, it will be not so much about defeating the enemy’s armed forces as about taking away industrial areas from him,” “after the destruction of the Russian army near Smolensk ... cut the railways leading to the Volga, and seize the entire territory up to this river.
The general plan of the enemy's actions in the Smolensk direction was to cut the defenses of the Western Front into three parts, encircle and liquidate his Nevelsk, Smolensk and Mogilev groupings and thereby create favorable conditions for an attack on Moscow.
The enemy troops in this direction were opposed by the practically re-created Western Front under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, whose troops were to create a defensive line: r. Zap. Dvina to Vitebsk, Orsha, r. Dnieper to Losev. By this period, the front command had scattered and weakened divisions of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th armies, which had withdrawn from the border regions and were withdrawn for reorganization and resupply. At the same time, the forces of the fresh 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies included in its composition and arriving in early July from the rear areas and other sectors of the front were transferred to the front. In total, by the beginning of the Smolensk battle, seven armies operated as part of the Western Front, five of which (13th, 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd) stood out in the first echelon. The second echelon was to be composed of units of the 4th and 16th armies. Realizing the complexity of the situation in the Western direction, the Headquarters decides in the rear of the Western Front, 100 km east of Smolensk, to deploy a front of reserve armies, which included six combined arms armies, a significant part of which was manned by militia formations.
For a long time in Soviet historiography, as an explanation and justification for the catastrophic defeats of the initial period of the war, including the unsuccessfully started Battle of Smolensk, they referred to the superiority of the enemy in manpower and equipment. To show this "superiority", the authors resorted to a variety of methods - from open falsifications to "original" methods. For example, the total number of troops on the Western Front at the beginning of the enemy offensive was 579,400 people. However, in official science, not the entire combat power of the Western Front was compared with the forces of the enemy, but only the forces of the first echelon, which consisted of 24 divisions, 145 tanks, about 3800 guns and mortars and 389 serviceable aircraft. Each division of the first echelon accounted for 25-30 km of the front defense line, and in some areas - up to 70 km. By the beginning of the offensive, Army Group Center had 29 divisions (12 infantry, 9 tank, 7 motorized and 1 cavalry), 1040 tanks, more than 6600 guns and mortars and over 1 thousand aircraft. With such a comparison, at the beginning of the enemy offensive on July 10, the ratio of the forces that entered the battle was in favor of the enemy: in people - 1.5: 1; in artillery 1.7:1; in tanks - 7:1.
As a rule, what followed was a description of the entire complexity of the situation in which the practically newly formed Western Front entered the battle. Our troops did not have time to prepare defensive lines in terms of engineering, defense was often organized under the fire of the advancing enemy. The command did not have clear intelligence information about the location, forces and plans of the Nazis. Many divisions did not have time to turn around at the indicated lines before the start of the enemy offensive and were immediately introduced into battle: in the Polotsk direction - units of the 22nd Army, in the Lepel direction - of the 20th Army, at the crossings across the Dnieper at Bykhov and Rogachev - of the 21st Army .
Of course, all these facts took place, but bringing them without analyzing the state of the enemy troops on the eve of the offensive is contrary to scientific principles. Firstly, not all the forces of Army Group Center were able to take part in the offensive "on Smolensk". The offensive began when the battle between Bialystok and Minsk was not over. Secondly, the enemy has largely lost its penetration ability. The tank units of the Army Group "Center" were pretty battered by the resistance of the Soviet army and off-road. Only in the 3rd tank group in the first days of July, losses in tanks amounted to 50%. The losses in manpower were palpable. Thus, from June 22 to June 28, the 9th Army Corps suffered losses of 1900 soldiers and officers (killed and wounded), the 78th Infantry Division lost 340 people in Belarus, the 137th - 700, the 263rd - 650, etc. e. It is obvious that at the beginning of the offensive, the central group of German troops did not have the superiority that was attributed to it in Soviet historiography. On the contrary, we can agree with the German historian W. Haupt, who noted that "for the first time during the campaign it turned out that the Soviets were stronger."
From the very beginning of the war, the Nazi command did not hope for a numerical superiority of its troops, especially against the background of the mobilization capabilities of the Soviet Union, the huge superiority of the Red Army in tanks, aviation, etc. The German command relied on swiftness, readiness and coherence of the military mechanism. The haste in the offensive was caused primarily by the desire to prevent the creation of a solid defense by the retreating armies from Belarus and the newly arrived Soviet units at the front.
For a rapid breakthrough of our defenses, the German command in the zone of main attacks created a significant superiority in forces. The concentration of tanks in the breakthrough places reached 30 units per one kilometer of the front. So, in the offensive zone of the 18th tank and 29th motorized divisions of the enemy (offensive front 37 km), 350 tanks were brought into battle. In the 18.53 and 110th Soviet rifle divisions opposing them, there were no tanks at all. Sixteen enemy divisions acted against the six divisions of the 22nd Army, which were defending in a 280 km zone.
On July 10, 1941, the Nazi troops went on the offensive in the central sector of the front. The Germans delivered the main blow in two directions - from the Vitebsk region towards Dukhovshchina (in order to bypass Smolensk from the north) and from the Orsha-Mogilev region to Yelnya (in order to bypass Smolensk from the south and thereby encircle the main forces of the Western Front). At the same time, in the north - on the right wing of our Western Front - the enemy launched an auxiliary blow in the northeast direction towards Nevel and Velikiye Luki, and on the left wing - to the southeast in the direction of Krichev. With these strikes, the Nazis planned to isolate the flank groupings of the Soviet troops on the Western Front.
At the beginning of their offensive, the Nazis achieved significant success, but then the situation began to change. Instead of a swift victorious operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were drawn into a bloody two-month battle on the Smolensk lines.
Even in the Soviet period, a periodization of the Smolensk battle developed, considering this grandiose confrontation on the central sector of the front in four stages: the first - from July 10 to 20; the second - from July 20 to August 7; the third - from 8 to 21 August; the fourth - from August 22 to September 10. The very isolation and definition of the boundaries of these periods (taking into account the nature of hostilities, the setting of goals and the results achieved) seems quite legitimate, but many conclusions from the standpoint of the achievements of modern science seem very controversial.
Let's make an attempt to analyze the stages of the Battle of Smolensk from the standpoint of a set of documents and materials that are currently available to modern Russian researchers.
The first stage was characterized by a successful start of the offensive for the German army, especially on the right wing and in the center of the Soviet Western Front. Our troops were forced to retreat to the east. The 22nd army of General F. A. Ershakov, who fought in the Polotsk region, was divided into two parts, and its divisions fought in encirclement. The 19th Army of General I.S. Konev, which did not have time to concentrate and turn around at the indicated line, could not hold back the onslaught of the enemy and retreated to Smolensk, where, together with the 16th Army of General M.F. Lukin and the 20th Army of General P A. Kurochkina fought in almost complete encirclement. The 13th Army of General V.F. Gerasimenko was also dissected, one of its units fought in encirclement in the Mogilev region, the other in the Krichev region.
On the southern flank of the Western Front, the situation developed differently. Here, on July 13, the 21st Army of General F.I. Kuznetsov went on the offensive in the direction of Bobruisk and drove the Germans out of the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin. This blow for the German command turned out to be a complete surprise, and it hastily began to transfer mechanized units from near Smolensk to the breakthrough area.
A difficult situation developed directly in the Smolensk direction. The enemy was looking for weak spots in our defense and sent blows from his motorized units there. So, for example, having met stubborn resistance on the main road to Smolensk from Orsha, which was provided by units of the 20th Soviet Army, the invaders changed the direction of the main attack, rushing to Krasny. By July 14, 1941, the tank divisions of the 39th German motorized corps made their way to Rudna and Demidov, the 47th motorized corps rushed to Smolensk through Krasny, the 46th corps covered Smolensk from the south. There was a catastrophic situation - on the fifth day of the offensive, the enemy was at the gates of Smolensk. On July 14, the commander of the Western Front gave an order according to which the defense of the city was entrusted to the commander of the 16th Army, Lieutenant General Lukin, and all Soviet troops who were in the defense sector of the city and arrived from the rear and from other directions were subordinate to him.
It should be noted that General Lukin received this order a day and a half before the capture of Smolensk by the enemy. It is legitimate to pose the question - did Lukin have the opportunity to prevent the capture of Smolensk? In our opinion, the answer is obvious - the command of the front set an already impossible task for General Lukin. At that time, the commander had only two divisions at his disposal - the 46th Major General Filatov and the 152nd Colonel Chernyshev, who occupied the defense north of the Moscow-Minsk highway (the rest of the army divisions were either transferred to other armies, or were on the way to Smolensk ). The only thing that the command of the 16th Army could do in this situation was to create mobile mobile groups to cover the most dangerous directions with them. One of these groups, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel P.I. Bunyashin, near the village of Khokhlovo on the Krasny-Smolensk road, an ambush was set up: ditches were dug, blockages were made between the houses, guns and machine guns were placed so that they could conduct crossfire. An enemy motorcycle regiment fell into this ambush, which was practically completely destroyed. Subsequently, the Nazis made three attempts to take Khokhlovo, but each time their attacks were repulsed by the courageously defending Soviet soldiers. Only after the fourth assault did the detachment begin to retreat to Smolensk.
Of course, the heroic resistance of individual units and formations could weaken and delay the offensive of the Nazi troops in certain directions. At the beginning of the Smolensk battle, the soldiers of the 127th Infantry Division courageously showed themselves, who already on July 11 entered the battle 30 km from Rudnya with the advanced units of the enemy's 3rd Panzer Group. With a swift and unexpected blow, the soldiers of the division attacked the rearguard of the enemy and put him to flight. Pulling up the main forces, the enemy attacked the positions of the division, and he managed to surround one of its battalions. The encircled battalion under the command of Captain M.S. Dzhavoev, having found a weak spot in the enemy’s defense, quickly broke through from the encirclement. During the first days of the battle, this battalion alone destroyed more than a hundred Nazis and 20 enemy tanks. A striking example of heroism and military skill is the strike of the 57th Panzer Division under the command of Colonel V. A. Mishulin. The division was advanced from Smolensk to the Krasnoy area and on the move entered into an oncoming battle with the enemy's 29th motorized division. The enemy, having suffered significant losses, was forced to suspend his offensive. But the fate of the city, which did not have sufficient forces for defense and found itself under the concentrated attack of enemy motorized groups, was already a foregone conclusion.
On the evening of July 15, enemy mobile groups entered the southern part of Smolensk from the side of Roslavl, Kyiv highway and Krasninsky Bolshak. During July 16, the Nazis managed to capture most of the city. Resistance to the enemy directly in the city was provided by the Smolensk garrison, the most combat-ready part of which was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Bunyashin. In addition to this detachment, the following entered the battle on the streets of Smolensk: the brigade of P.F. Malyshev, the city police detachment under the command of G.N. Odintsov, the cadets of the police school, headed by F.I. Mikhailov, the fighter battalion under the command of E.I. etc. These semi-regular formations could not organize persistent, organized resistance. First, the defenders retreated to the city center, then to the Park of Culture and Leisure and to Smirnov Square. At night, having blown up the bridges behind them (on July 15 at 24.00 a new bridge across the Dnieper was blown up, on July 16 at 2–3.00 - the old one, however, there is some evidence that the railway bridge was not destroyed, which the enemy immediately used), the defenders of the city crossed to the other side of the Dnieper.
In post-war historiography, a certain pattern has developed in which these battles are described. The central place is occupied by the heroic examples shown by the defenders of Smolensk during the defense of the city. In the battles on the streets of the city, the brave G. N. Odintsov and F. I. Mikhailov died the death of the brave. At the House of Specialists, policeman G.I. Poddubny performed a heroic deed, throwing himself under an enemy tank with a bunch of grenades. The defenders of the northern part of the city showed particular perseverance, about whom the German sources say the following:
“In the northern part of the city, in the industrial suburbs, the militia and workers' militia fought stubbornly. Each house, each basement had to be stormed separately, knocking out the defenders from there with small arms, hand grenades and bayonets.
Undoubtedly, those Soviet armed forces that took part in the defense of the city showed heroism and determination, but these facts should not obscure the scale of the catastrophe that occurred - almost immediately, the Nazis captured the most important stronghold of our defense, which was of great strategic and political importance. The rapid capture of Smolensk by the enemy is a clear indicator of the level of organization and command of troops in the western strategic direction. Upon the capture of Smolensk, a special "Military Expert Commission on the issue of leaving Smolensk by our troops on July 15–16, 1941" was created, headed by General I.P. Camera.
Of course, when working with the documents of this commission, it is necessary to take into account the conditions in which it worked, and the pressure from the Headquarters, and personally from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but at the moment the materials of the commission are one of the few official documents that summarize and analyze significant material on the capture Smolensk. Already in the very name of the commission, which worked in "hot pursuit", the phrase "abandonment of Smolensk" was indicated. The definition of military operations in the Smolensk region as "the defense of Smolensk" will appear much later. The results of the work of this commission were summarized in November 1941. According to the data collected by the commission, units with a total number of 6.5 thousand people were directly involved in the defense of the city, and in the garrison “there were no personnel units, but only spare and special ones.” Regarding the battles directly outside the city, the commission draws an unambiguous conclusion:
"The battles directly for the city of Smolensk on 07/15/1941 continued extremely transiently."
Both the command of the garrison and the command of the 16th Army, which were responsible for the defense of the city, did not take effective measures to ensure a stable and effective defense of Smolensk: "instead of organized resistance to the enemy, in the southern part of the city with the available forces ... the defense of the city took the form of scattered battles with the enemy", "from the side of 16 A, who knew about the difficult situation of the city, no real measures were taken, and the entire fight against the advancing enemy was transferred to the hands of only the head of the garrison. With regard to those units that covered the southern part of the city, the conclusion of the commission, based on the conclusions of the Military Council of the 16th Army, sounds unambiguous: "turned out to be extremely unstable and, at the first clash with the enemy, surrendered the city without any armed resistance".
As you can see, the commission made a conclusion that is not entirely consistent with the scale of the events that took place. The capture of Smolensk by the enemy was the culmination of a large-scale operation by the German Army Group Center, which unfolded on a front several hundred kilometers and almost 200 kilometers deep into our defenses. Such a scale cannot be the area of responsibility of the army command (in our case, the 16th army). In addition, responsibility for the defense of the city was assigned to General Lukin just a day and a half before the invaders entered the southern suburbs of Smolensk. The rapid capture of Smolensk by the enemy is a clear indicator of the level of organization and command of troops in the entire western strategic direction (on the scale of the front, and the General Staff, and Headquarters).
The conclusions of the commission about the rapid capture of the city without the staunch resistance of its defenders are also confirmed by the documents of the German side. So, in the report of one of the units that took part in the capture of Smolensk, it was noted: “When we entered this dead city, a ghostly picture opened before us. No shots were heard. Separate appearing Soviet soldiers rushed to their heels. All bridges across the Dnieper were destroyed.” Having “viewed” the breakthrough of the mobile German group to Smolensk, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction S. K. Timoshenko and the commander of the Western Front took actions to defend the northern part of the city and return Smolensk under their control. Already on July 16, under the command of Lukin, the 129th, 12th and 158th rifle divisions entered. These forces significantly outnumbered the enemy troops, who had captured almost the entire city. But time was lost, the enemy was firmly entrenched on the achieved lines. Our units moved to the defense of the northern part of the city along the Dnieper River.
As you know, the capture of Smolensk caused anger on the part of the Supreme Commander. Subsequently, the Soviet troops, in pursuance of Stalin's order, would carry out constant attacks in order to recapture Smolensk. So, on July 20, soldiers of the 127th and 158th rifle divisions crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper and started fighting with the enemy, liberated part of the city, but could not gain a foothold on the captured lines.
It is sad to realize that in almost the same way, but without any opposition, the Nazis, more than two months later, will take possession of Vyazma, thereby completing the creation of the huge “Vyazemsky cauldron”. Moreover, it should be noted that our troops were not able to effectively use natural barriers in defensive battles: in Smolensk - the Dnieper, in the Vyazma direction - the Dnieper, Vopets and other rivers. But on the other hand, these same barriers cost a lot of blood to our soldiers during the liberation of the region in 1943.
Very often, especially in Soviet historiography, one of the main reasons for the capture of Smolensk is the lack of engineering and defensive structures. But in the initial period of the Smolensk battle, a similar situation developed in other sectors of the front, where there were fortifications. For example, in the summary of the operational department of the headquarters of the 24th army, parts of which defended the city of Yelnya, for July 18 it was noted that the construction of defensive lines in the city area was completed by 85 %. However, despite the time available for the preparation and arrangement of defensive lines, the presence of artillery, the city of Yelnya was taken by the enemy during a fleeting battle on July 19, 1941.
It can be concluded that the Soviet high command did not develop effective measures to combat the enemy's mobile formations. The enemy, using them, broke through the line of defense, entered the operational space, made large-scale movements with deep coverage for tens and even hundreds of kilometers. Moreover, according to the commander of the 3rd tank group G. Goth, Smolensk was captured on July 16 by the forces of only one 29th motorized division.
Based on the above materials, it can be argued that numerous Soviet historiography, testifying to the facts of feat and heroism in the battles for Smolensk, is associated with individual, isolated facts of the manifestation of heroism on July 15-16, 1941 in the battles for the city (but not mass heroism and perseverance ), which is quite traditional. As you know, very often the fearlessness, courage and heroism of individual warriors just compensate for mass panic, irresponsibility, and sometimes even open betrayal. In separate works, considering the "heroic defense of Smolensk", the authors focus on the facts of heroism and courage shown by Soviet soldiers during the period of numerous attempts to return the city, but not during its defense. Rather vague is the expediency of capturing Smolensk by troops who themselves were practically completely surrounded and who, sooner or later, will be given the task of breaking through to the main forces of the front. But such was the requirement of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
At the first stage of the Smolensk battle, the Nazis achieved the main goals of the initial stage of the offensive operation. They managed to break through the front line, advance 200 km, capture Smolensk, Yelnya, Velikiye Luki, Yartsevo and practically encircle units of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies. However, it was during these first days of the Battle of Smolensk that Hitler's strategy cracked.
Firstly, the Soviet troops offered stubborn resistance to the enemy, which the enemy did not expect, thinking that our troops would retreat to the east due to the threat of encirclement. So, in the report on the combat operations of the 2nd tank group from 12.07 to 10.08.1941, it was noted: “When very large enemy forces were found in front of the 2nd tank group east of the Dnieper and south of Smolensk, the command of the 3rd tank group did not believed that the enemy would risk throwing them into a decisive battle near Smolensk. As can be seen from the document, the enemy expected that our troops, due to the threat of encirclement, would retreat to new defensive positions, and they did not plan to create a “Smolensk cauldron”. But the fighting began to develop in a different scenario. And, as it turned out, the forces for the rapid defeat of the Soviet troops in the current situation at the front were clearly not enough.
Our troops not only offered serious resistance, but also inflicted significant damage on the enemy. For example, the encircled units of the 13th army of General V.F. Gerasimenko, only from July 11 to 16, according to Soviet data, 227 vehicles, 27 guns, 11 aircraft and at least 1 thousand Nazis were destroyed in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Sozh. The troops of the 20th Army under the command of General P. A. Kurochkin east of Orsha inflicted significant losses on the 27th Motorized Corps of the enemy. The enemy lost 35 tanks and 25 motorcycles and was forced to fight in this area for three days. Even taking into account the postscripts inherent in Soviet military statistics, it can be argued that the enemy in the Smolensk direction suffered losses (German statistics will be given below), which were not equal during the entire previous period of the Second World War.
Here, near Orsha, the first blow was delivered to the enemy with BM-13 rocket launchers. The volley, which lasted only 15 seconds, inflicted significant damage on the enemy.
Parts of the Red Army managed to carry out a number of counteroffensive operations. The offensive of the corps of the 21st Army under the command of F.I. Kuznetsov achieved the greatest success, some units of which managed to break through into the depth of the enemy defense for 80 km. In total, the army troops pinned down up to 15 fascist divisions, which significantly weakened the enemy's onslaught in the main direction.
Secondly, after the capture of Smolensk, the enemy failed to launch a further offensive against Moscow. On July 17, the path of the enemy units was blocked by the formed battle group under the command of General Rokossovsky, consisting of the 38th Rifle Division and the 101st Panzer Division, and the active actions of the encircled Soviet units did not give the Nazis the opportunity to release a sufficient number of troops for a successful advance in the Moscow direction. The troops of K.K. Rokossovsky not only stopped the enemy, but also carried out a swift and unexpected offensive operation for the enemy. On July 19–20, 1941, having crossed the river, they struck at the enemy who did not have time to gain a foothold, and liberated the city of Yartsevo (almost two months before the liberation of Yelnya, recognized as the first of those liberated during the war years).
In addition, as noted above, the German command expected that our troops would retreat due to the threat of envelopment. However, our units located in a semi-encirclement organized an active defense and made incessant attempts to return Smolensk. The enemy clearly did not have enough forces to defeat this grouping. The German troops resembled a boa constrictor that swallowed prey that it could not digest. In the future, the lessons of the "Smolensk cauldron" will be used in the preparation of the Typhoon operation, when the enemy concentrated the necessary amount of forces not only for a rapid breakthrough and encirclement, but also for the rapid destruction of the encircled troops. The Vyazemsky cauldron was cleared by the enemy in less than ten days.
Thirdly, the enemy was unable to achieve complete encirclement and isolation of units of the 16th, 19th and 20th armies from the main forces of the front. In part, the presence of a corridor connecting the Soviet troops located in the Smolensk region with the main forces of the front is explained by the inconsistency in the actions of the German army and tank groups (the troops of the 2nd German tank group and the 4th army, operating from the south, "were late with reaching the intended line" ). For almost the entire period of the fighting, the encircled Soviet armies in the enemy rear operated a crossing across the Dnieper near the village of Solovyevo (15 km south of Yartsevo), which provided the encircled 16th and 20th armies with communication with the main forces of the front.
If in the first period of the Smolensk battle, Soviet troops fought mainly defensive battles, then in the subsequent part of the Western and Reserve fronts (within the Smolensk region) they conduct offensive operations.
The second period of the Smolensk battle is characterized by the transition of parts of the Western Front to the offensive with the aim of returning Smolensk and destroying the enemy's Smolensk grouping. It is distinguished by the widespread use of active methods of combat operations on both sides, which led to a sharp increase in tension on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. And it was at this stage of the Smolensk battle that the tension of the confrontation between the Soviet and German troops in the western strategic direction reached its climax - the German command would go on the defensive in the central sector of the front.
On July 19, the Headquarters decided to launch a counteroffensive in the Western Front. The next day, July 20, Stalin and Zhukov held negotiations with the front commander Timoshenko, where the Supreme Commander, in his usual manner, set the task for the marshal to create strike groups of 7-8 divisions: "I think it's time for us to move from being petty to acting in large groups."
In pursuance of the order of the Headquarters, 5 army operational groups were created from 20 divisions of the front of the reserve armies, consisting of 3-4 divisions each, which became part of the Western Front. These groups of troops, led by Generals V. A. Khomenko, S. A. Kalinin, K. K. Rokossovsky, V. Ya. Kachalov and I. I. Maslennikov, were to deliver simultaneous attacks from the northeast, east and south in general direction to Smolensk. After the defeat of the enemy that had broken through, they were to link up with the main forces of the 16th and 20th armies.
When planning the actions of our operational groups, the Soviet command set ambitious tasks for them, indicating errors in assessing the operational situation in the Western direction and underestimating the enemy. So, for example, the following task was set before the group of General Khomenko on July 24: “... the main task of this group is to defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region and reach the line of the Dnieper River to restore the position and expel the enemy from the Orsha region” (information of the BODO negotiations between Zhukov and Timoshenko on July 24).
To increase the strike power of these groups, each division assigned to the offensive was assigned a tank battalion (21 tanks), and the 104th tank division was transferred to the group of General Kachalov. To support and cover the strike groups from the air, three aviation groups were allocated, each consisting of up to a mixed aviation division. In addition, given the length of enemy communications and the lagging behind of his rear units, it was decided to send a cavalry group (comprising three cavalry divisions) concentrated in the 21st Army zone to raid behind enemy lines.
The situation did not favor the transition to the offensive, but its necessity was also obvious. It was impossible to give the Nazis the opportunity to take advantage of the results achieved in the Smolensk direction. It was necessary to force him to disperse his strike groups and pull the enemy troops to secondary directions. In addition, an important task was to remove the threat of complete encirclement of the 16th and 20th armies.
The fact that 20 divisions of armored vehicles and aviation were assigned to strike groups indicates that at that time the troops of the front and all the armed forces had the necessary reserves and forces to carry out major offensive operations. In Soviet historiography, attention is focused on the lack of strength and weakness of these operational groups, but this is not the main problem for us. It should be recalled that the enemy troops captured Smolensk with just the forces of one division. The main issue of the effective use of these forces lies in a calculated and competent strategy for using these troops, in determining the most vulnerable areas of defense, in the coherence and coordination of actions and the skill of the troops.
The offensive of our troops, in the 20th of July, coincided with active offensive operations and enemy troops, seeking to expand and strengthen the outer ring of encirclement. The battles of the second period were distinguished by a counter character and bitterness. However, it should be said that it was not possible to achieve the set goal during the offensive of the units of the Western Front at the end of July 1941. The forces for inflicting effective strikes on the enemy turned out to be clearly not enough, moreover, the troops acted in isolation from each other and had too little time to prepare the operation. In some areas, our troops managed to achieve some success. Thus, the shock group of troops of the 30th Army acted in the direction of Dukhovshchina and advanced 20-25 km with battles, pinning down large enemy forces. The offensive of other parts of the Western Front was not successful. For example, the group of General Kachalov, which went on the offensive on July 23, was surrounded and suffered significant losses. By July 27, the divisions of the group during the continuous fighting lost: 104 TD - 1540 people killed and wounded; 143 sd - 966 people killed and wounded; 145 sd - 2241; only 45 guns of all calibers remained in the entire group, etc. During the breakthrough from the encirclement, General Kachalov also died. Almost the entire task force of Kachalov was destroyed and captured by the enemy. In the operational report of the GA "Center" dated 8/8/1941, it was noted that 38,561 Red Army soldiers, 250 tanks and reconnaissance vehicles, 359 guns of all calibers, etc. were taken prisoner in the Roslavl region.
The desire to return Smolensk by any means in fulfillment of the requirements of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief led to the fact that units of the 16th and 20th armies, which had stormed the outskirts of the city since July 20, weakened the flanks. On July 26–27, the enemy managed to strike at the rear of these armies and encircle them north of the city.
In addition, a simultaneous strike by operational groups did not work out. For example, the group of troops of General Rokossovsky was unable to go on the offensive at the set time, repelling numerous enemy attacks. But it was this group that, having stopped the enemy, delivered a blow that ensured the breaking of the enemy ring, in which at the end of July there were units of the 20th and 16th armies north of Smolensk.
Despite the heavy, ongoing battles and heavy losses, including in the conditions of encirclement, the Red Army units, according to the German military leaders themselves, fought "fiercely and fanatically." The fierce resistance of the Soviet troops near Smolensk weakened the offensive power of the German Army Group Center. She was pinned down on all sectors of the front. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock wrote in those days: “I am now forced to bring into battle all my combat-ready divisions from the army group reserve ... I need every person on the front line ... Despite huge losses ... the enemy attacks daily in several sectors in such a way that until now it was not possible to regroup forces, pull up reserves. Unless a crushing blow is dealt somewhere soon, it will be difficult to complete their complete defeat before the onset of winter. It was during the battle of Smolensk that the miscalculation of the Nazi command in assessing the ability of the Soviet troops to resist was clearly manifested.
As a result of stubborn and bloody defensive battles near Smolensk and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the enemy’s offensive pace weakened, Wehrmacht units were exhausted and suffered significant losses, and, most importantly, the enemy could no longer attack in all three main directions.
Based on the current situation, Hitler signs Directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941, according to which the troops of Army Group Center were to go on the defensive. By order of the Fuhrer, the main efforts of the Wehrmacht from the center were transferred to the flanks. In August, it was planned to continue the offensive, primarily with the aim of encircling and destroying Soviet troops in Ukraine, as well as blocking Leningrad together with the Finnish troops. The tank groups that were part of Bock's troops were withdrawn from the battles for an urgent restoration of combat capability and their subsequent use on the flanks of the Eastern Front (the 2nd tank group of General Guderian became subordinate to the commander of Army Group South, the 3rd tank group of General Hoth supported offensive of Army Group North). This decision was the last point in a long dispute between Hitler and the German General Staff about the direction of strategic strikes in the war with the USSR. Many prominent military leaders of Nazi Germany (Halder, Jodl, Guderian, Tippelskirch, and others) considered the decision to turn forces to the south to “capture Ukraine” as one of the tragic decisions during the war with Russia.
Thus, the heroism of the Soviet soldiers in the central direction and other sectors of the front forced the German command to reconsider its original plans and change the direction of the main attacks in August-September. Among the German generals at that time, doubts were increasingly expressed about the "possibility of achieving decisive success" in one direction or another, because the stubborn resistance of the Red Army "leads to a critical aggravation of the situation in certain areas." According to the German side, from June 22 to August 13, 1941, the losses of the entire eastern front amounted to 3,714 officers, 76,389 soldiers and non-commissioned officers; wounded - 9161 officers and 264,975 soldiers and non-commissioned officers. These figures amounted to approximately 10% of the total number of troops on the eastern front. Compared with the losses of the Wehrmacht in Poland and France, they were extremely high.
However, the Soviet troops suffered significantly greater losses. For example, only in August 1941, the troops of the Western Front lost 138 thousand people. The researcher L. N. Lopukhovsky, using the example of separate units of the Soviet and German armies opposing each other, attempted to determine the ratio of losses during the defensive battles of this period in the western direction. Comparing the 19th Soviet Army, whose losses amounted to 45 thousand people from August 1 to September 10, 1941, and the losses of the German 8th Army Corps opposing it - about 7 thousand people supporting its 7th Panzer (about 1 thousand people) and the 14th motorized (about 1 thousand people) divisions, he received a ratio of 4.4: 1 in favor of the enemy.
The third stage of the Battle of Smolensk arose from the peculiarities of the operational-strategic situation that was developing at that time on the Soviet-German front. In the period from August 8 to 21, the Soviet command made a new attempt to seize the initiative. With the turn of a significant part of the forces of the Army Group "Center" to the south, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts went on the offensive in order to defeat the Yelninskaya and Dukhovshchinskaya enemy groupings. It should be noted that in the first half of August, the epicenter of military events moved south, to the zone of the Central (created by the Stavka on July 24 with the subordination of the 13th and 21st armies), and then the Bryansk fronts (created on August 16 as part of the 13th and 50th armies).
On August 8, the 2nd Panzer Group of the enemy went on the offensive and broke through the defenses of the Central Front in the zone of the 13th Army. At the same time, the 2nd Field Army deeply enveloped the 21st Army from the east. Simultaneously with the blows of the enemy troops, offensive operations were resumed by units of the Western Front. The troops, in accordance with the order, were to "firmly holding the lines of the Dnieper River with the left wing of the front and repelling enemy attacks on its right wing, crush and destroy the enemy's Dukhovshchin grouping with the center." The main role in solving the task was assigned to the formations of the 19th and 30th armies.
On August 8, the troops of these armies went on the offensive, for several days parts of the armies unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy positions. The Germans organized a dense defense and offered effective resistance. One of the few positive results of our attack on Dukhovshchina was a breakthrough in the zone of the 19th Army from the enemy rear of General Boldin's group, which made a 500-kilometer raid behind enemy lines. On August 15, the front command gave the order to continue the Dukhovshchina operation. This stage of the Dukhovshchina operation was more carefully prepared, provided with troops and weapons. On August 17, the 19th Army began the offensive, and then the 30th and 29th armies passed to it. The troops broke through the enemy defenses, but failed to develop further success. The offensive capabilities of the armies have dried up. But as a result of offensive actions, the enemy was forced to transfer the 57th mechanized corps from the 3rd tank group to the Dukhovshchin direction.
The offensive by the forces of the Reserve Front in the Elninsk direction was less successful. Parts of the 24th Army did not fulfill the assigned task - to destroy the Elninsk ledge. But it was precisely the active offensive operations that led to the fact that the strike group, which the enemy concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Elnin ledge, was bled to death. So, in a telegram-report from the headquarters of the 46th tank corps to the commander of the 2nd German tank group, it was noted:
“There are ongoing battles in the area of the Yelnin bridgehead. The combat effectiveness of the corps, especially the SS divisions and the Grossdeutschland infantry regiment, is declining daily to such an extent that their further combat use raises serious doubts.
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Stages, goals of the battle
A large number of German troops surrounded Smolensk, as well as the nearest cities to it. But the Soviet Army managed to gather all its forces and organize the Western Front. Several battles were fought during the defensive operation.
The main clashes took place near Bobruisk, Velikoluksky, Gomel, Dukhovshchinsk, Yelninsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Smolensk, Roslavl-Novozybkov. The purpose of the whole complex of operations was not to let the enemy go further to Moscow, to give the Soviet army the opportunity to prepare, to organize its defense.
Reasons, preparation
The reasons that served to organize defensive measures were the fact that the German command ordered its army to break through the Western Front at any cost for further rapid advance towards Moscow. From several large armies, a group called "Center" was created, led by Field Marshal Von Bock.
The Soviet command, having revealed Hitler's plans, issued a decree on the preparation of defensive and offensive measures to protect the path to Moscow and push the Germans away from the front line and Smolensk. S. K. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front, composed of several armies.
The course of the operation, the results
The German army was four times larger than the Soviet one, possessed a large set of equipment, modern weapons, this allowed it to occupy Smolensk for some time. Despite all the obstacles, the task of not letting the enemy go further was completed. Having received reinforcements, the USSR army launched a counteroffensive, which came as a complete surprise to the enemy.
From the moment of the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops, the Germans were forced to turn from the attackers into the defenders. The subsequent reorganization of the USSR army made it possible to create a powerful front. The battles lasted a long time and with varying success, the winners were either one or the other, but in the end the fascist threat in the direction of Moscow and Smolensk was eliminated.
Briefly about the battle of Smolensk
Smolenskoe srazhenie 1941
One of the key events of the Great Patriotic War was the Battle of Smolensk, briefly describing it, historians put together all the hostilities from July 10 to September 10, 1941 near the city of Smolensk, which took place between German and Soviet troops.
The German army group "Center" sought to encircle the Soviet troops, and intended to break the road to Moscow. The USSR put up against the advancing Germans two-thirds of the second strategic echelon, behind which at that time the defense of the West was assigned. Dvina and Dnieper. The Germans had a significant advantage, both in military equipment and in the number of soldiers. During the battle, all the battles took place with varying success. Part of the Soviet troops was still surrounded, but after the arrival of reinforcements, the armies of the Western Front managed to stop the German offensive and save their comrades.
In August, the main battles were fought closer to the Center zone, the troops of F.I. Kuznetsov and A.I. Eremenko were cut off from each other, and went beyond the Dnieper in order to avoid encirclement. In mid-August, the situation changed when the 24th and 43rd reserve armies under the command of G.K. Zhukov, with the support of the forces of the Western Front, carried out a successful counteroffensive, inflicting considerable damage on the Germans. However, the success was short-lived, and the Soviet troops then again had to go on the defensive.
Although during the battle of Smolensk, the Soviet troops failed to turn the tide of the war and save Smolensk, which finally fell on July 29, from capture, the German offensive was nevertheless thwarted, and a third of the German troops in this area were destroyed. This was the first real attempt by the Soviet leadership to stop the advance of the Germans, before that, with the permission of Stalin, they had captured the right-bank Ukraine and the western regions of Belarus almost without hindrance, it was these territories that were part of the Soviet Union that had been under the rule of the Germans for the longest time.
Von Leeb in the north of the Soviet-German front, in the center, in the Moscow direction, from July 10 to September 10, 1941, a gigantic battle of five armies of the Center von Bock group for the Dnieper unfolded. This battle includes operations Smolensk, Roslavl and Gomel. For several weeks, a stubborn struggle was waged for the possession of these points and the surrounding areas, where large masses of Marshal's Soviet armies were surrounded and locked in three tactical bags. Tymoshenko.
Promotion of German troops in the USSR, 1941
The battle ended with the elimination of these bags on August 7, 9 and 21, and at least a third of all Tymoshenko's forces surrendered and were captured. The struggle for Smolensk was especially stubborn. The Germans broke into this city already on July 15-16, but the Soviet troops finally left it only on the 28th. According to Gen. Yodly, surrounded in the forests, the Russian fighters fired to the last bullet, in the last 10 days they did not have a crumb of bread in their mouths, they ate leaves, grass, and yet they fought and surrendered only when they were completely exhausted.
In these three operations the Germans captured 430,000 prisoners, 3,600 tanks and 4,300 guns.
The German command concluded that the Soviet Western Front was no longer able to offer serious resistance and that Army Group Center was capable of conducting a further offensive against Moscow with infantry divisions alone, without the two tank armies originally allocated to it. On July 19, the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) issued Directive No. 33 on the further conduct of the war in the East, and on July 23, an addition to it, in which the task of defeating the Soviet troops between Smolensk and Moscow and capturing Moscow was assigned to the 2nd and 9th Infantry army.
Directive No. 33 ordered the transfer of the tank formations of the Army Group Center to the GA Sever (Gotha tank group) and the South GA (Guderian tank group). On July 23, Hitler, in a conversation with the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter von Brauchitsch, and the chief of the General Staff, Franz Halder, stated: “After the end of the fighting in the Smolensk region, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups should disperse one to the right, the other to the left in order to support the troops of army groups "South" and "North". Army Group "Center" should conduct an offensive against Moscow with the forces of some infantry divisions ... ".
According to the German military leaders, this decision led to a delay in the advance on Moscow and, ultimately, to the failure of the Barbarossa plan. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, German Goth, later wrote: “This was a complete renunciation of the original plan - with powerful forces concentrated in the center, break through Smolensk to Moscow. The powerful forces of the center, consisting of two tank groups and three field armies, were reduced to one field army. Both tank groups - the main striking force - were transferred one to the right, the other to the left. It is quite obvious that such a circumstance was contrary to the principle - to attack where the enemy is most weakened, that is<…>, between Smolensk and Velikie Luki in the direction of Rzhev.
But was Timoshenko really defeated completely? No, and the Germans almost did not move forward from the site of the Smolensk battles. In early September, less than a month after these defeats, Timoshenko, taking advantage of the fact that Hitler had weakened von Bock's army group, launched a counteroffensive on the Dukhovshchina-Vyazma-Roslavl-Gomel front.
Halder, the former Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, writes in his memoirs: “... In early September, Timoshenko unexpectedly launched a strong counteroffensive against the 4th Army of the F. Kluge on the Desna ... We lost 8 divisions and on September 5 we had to clear the bend of the Desna. This Soviet counterattack was repulsed, but it did its job: because of it, the operation against Moscow slowed down even more.
Hitler, mistakenly believing that Timoshenko was finished, decided to send a further blow not to Moscow, which now, in his opinion, could not get away from him anywhere, but to Kiev, more precisely, to Ukraine, temporarily suspending the offensive in the center, in the Moscow direction.
Hitler believed that at the moment Ukraine was more important for him than Moscow, which would not escape its fate anyway. Ukraine will immediately give him bread, raw materials - the Donetsk industrial and coal basin - not to mention the fact that he needs Ukraine for political reasons: it is known that he wanted to tear it away from Russia.
It is also undoubted that Hitler was pushed to this by the very favorable operational situation that had developed. Having advanced in a wedge in the center (in the Moscow direction) and on the extreme right (southern) flank of the group, the army of the South von Rundstedt (in the bend of the lower Dnieper), the Germans geographically already covered the Ukrainian group of Soviet troops Budyonny with these wedges, partly stuck on the western bank of the Dniester and stubbornly defending approaches to Kiev, and partly thrown back beyond the Dnieper (near Cherkasy and Kremenchug). Hitler wanted to use this situation to encircle Budyonny, cutting off his path with a double blow from the north and from the south in the eastern strip from the Dnieper. In this, the Germans had great success. (Cm.
In the summer of 1941, near the walls of Smolensk, Hitler's hopes of conducting a brilliant blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union were not destined to come true. Here, belonging to the Army Group "Center", for 2 months they got bogged down in battles with units of the Red Army and thereby lost not only time, but also the speed of advancement, as well as the forces that they might need in the future.
The battle of Smolensk in 1941 was a whole complex of operations, both offensive and defensive. They were carried out by units of the troops of the Central, Western, Bryansk and Reserve Fronts against the fascist troops belonging to the Army Group Center. The battle of Smolensk took place from July 10 to September 10. The confrontation between the two warring parties took place on a huge territory, covering about 650 km of the front line and deepening by about 250 km. A bloody great war began. The battle of Smolensk, I must say, played an important role in it.
German plans
It was the first year of the war. In July, the fascist leadership set the most important task for Field Marshal Theodore von Bock, who commanded the units of the Center armies. It consisted in the encirclement and further destruction of the Soviet troops holding the defense along the Dnieper and In addition, the German forces were to capture Orsha and Vitebsk. This would allow them to open a direct path for a decisive attack on Moscow.
By the end of June, the Soviet command began to rapidly increase the number of Red Army troops along the banks of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. The task was set: to occupy Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Kraslava, the Dnieper River and secure these lines. The battle of Smolensk was aimed at preventing the breakthrough of German troops into the central industrial regions of the country, as well as towards Moscow. 19 divisions were deployed to a depth of about 250 km from the front line. Smolensk was also prepared for defense.
On July 10, the troops of the Western Front, commanded by Marshal S. Timoshenko, consisted of 5 armies (37 divisions). And this is not counting the scattered units of the Soviet troops retreating from the territory of Western Belarus. But by that time, only 24 divisions had managed to arrive at the place of deployment.
Location and number of German troops
The battle of Smolensk in 1941 was truly grandiose. This is evidenced by the number of troops who took part in it. While the build-up of Soviet troops was going on, the German command was also concentrating the main forces of its two tank groups in the region of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper. At the same time, the infantry divisions of the 16th Army, which was part of the units of the North group, occupied the area from Drissa to Idritsa.
As for the two field armies belonging to the Center group, and this is more than 30 divisions, they lagged behind the forward formations by about 130-150 km. The reason for this delay was the fierce fighting on the territory of Belarus.
At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the Germans managed to create some superiority in equipment and manpower in the areas where the main attacks were directed.
The battle of Smolensk in 1941 is conventionally divided into 4 stages. Each of them is very important from the point of view of history.
First stage
It lasted from 10 to 20 July. Soviet soldiers at that time only repelled the ever-increasing blows of the enemy, which rained down on the right flank and center of the Western Front. The German Panzer Group of Hermann Goth and the 16th Field Army, acting together, managed to dismember the 22nd and break through the defenses of the 19th Army, located in the Vitebsk region. As a result of incessant fighting, the Nazis managed to capture Velizh, Polotsk, Nevel, Demidov and Dukhovshchina.
Having failed, the Soviet units of the 22nd Army strengthened their positions on the Lovat River. So they held Velikiye Luki. Meanwhile, the 19th, fighting, was forced to withdraw to Smolensk. There, together with the 16th Army, she fought defensive battles for the city.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer Group, commanded by Heinz Guderian, was able to surround the Soviet troops near Mogilev with part of their forces. Their main power was thrown at the capture of Orsha, Smolensk, Krichev and Yelnya. Some parts of the Soviet troops were surrounded, others tried to keep Mogilev. Meanwhile, the 21st Army carried out successful offensive operations and liberated Rogachev and Zhlobin. After that, without stopping, she began to advance on Bykhov and Bobruisk. By these actions, she fettered significant forces of the 2nd field army of the enemy.
Second phase
This is the period from July 21 to August 7. fought on the Western Front, received new reinforcements, and immediately went on the offensive in the area of \u200b\u200bthe settlements of Yartsevo, Bely and Roslavl. In the south, a cavalry group, consisting of three divisions, began its attack on the flank and tried to outflank the main forces of the enemy units, which were part of Army Group Center, from the rear. Later, lagging units also joined the Germans.
On July 24, the 13th and 21st armies were united into the Central Front. Colonel General F. Kuznetsov was appointed commander. As a result of stubborn and bloody battles, the Soviet troops managed to disrupt the planned offensive of the enemy tank groups, and the 16th fought their way out of the encirclement. After 6 days, another front was created - the Reserve. General G. Zhukov became its commander.
Third stage
It lasted from 8 to 21 August. At this time, the fighting moved south of Smolensk to the Central, and later to the Bryansk Front. The latter was created. Lieutenant General A. Eremenko was appointed to command him. Since August 8, units of the Red Army have successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Germans and their tank group. Instead of advancing on Moscow, the Nazis were forced to confront parts of the Soviet troops that threatened them from the south. But, despite this, the Germans still managed to move inland by about 120-150 km. They managed to wedge between two formations of the Central and Bryansk fronts.
There was a threat of encirclement. By the decision of the Headquarters, on August 19, parts of the Southwestern and Central Fronts were withdrawn beyond the Dnieper. The troops of the Western and Reserve, as well as the 43rd and 24th armies began to inflict powerful counterattacks on the enemy in the areas of Yartsevo and Yelnya. As a result, the Germans suffered huge losses.
Fourth stage
The final stage of the battle took place between August 22 and September 10. The second German army, together with the tank group, continued to fight with the Soviet units on the Bryansk front. At this time, enemy tanks were subjected to constant massive air strikes. More than 450 aircraft took part in these air raids. But, despite this, the offensive of the tank group could not be stopped. She dealt a powerful blow to the right flank of the Western Front. Thus, the city of Toropets was occupied by the Germans. The 22nd and 29th armies were forced to withdraw beyond the Western Dvina.
On September 1, the Soviet troops were ordered to go on the offensive, but it was not very successful. It was only possible to liquidate a rather dangerous German ledge near Yelnya. And already on September 10, it was decided to stop offensive operations and go on the defensive. Thus ended the Battle of Smolensk in 1941.
Defense of Smolensk
Some historians tend to believe that the Soviet units left the city on July 16th. But the facts show that the Red Army defended Smolensk. This is evidenced by the significant losses suffered by the Germans, who sought to break through to the very center of the city and capture it.
To delay the enemy troops, on July 17, on the orders of Colonel P. Malyshev, sappers blew up bridges across the Dnieper. For two days there were incessant fierce street battles, when many districts of the city could several times pass from one to the other hands.
Meanwhile, the Germans were building up their combat power, and on the morning of July 19, they still managed to capture part of Smolensk, located on the right bank of the river. But the Soviet troops were not going to surrender the city to the enemy. The Smolensk defensive battle continued on July 22 and 23. During it, the Red Army carried out quite successful counterattacks, and liberated street after street, block after block. In the battles for the city, the Nazis used flamethrower tanks. This technique from its muzzles spewed huge streaks of flame, reaching up to 60 m in length. In addition, German aircraft continuously flew over the heads of Soviet soldiers.
Particularly fierce battles were fought for the city cemetery, as well as for any of the stone buildings. Very often they developed into hand-to-hand fights, which usually ended in victory for the Soviet side. The intensity of the fighting was so high that the Germans simply did not have time to take out their dead and wounded from the field.
Of the three Soviet divisions that took part in the defense of Smolensk, no more than 250-300 soldiers remained in each, and food and ammunition were completely exhausted. Meanwhile, a consolidated group under the command of K. Rokossovsky recaptured the settlement of Yartsevo from the Germans, and also captured the crossings across the Dnieper near Solovyov and Ratchino. It was this action that made it possible to withdraw the 19th and 16th Soviet armies from the encirclement.
The last units of the Red Army left Smolensk on the night of July 28-29. Only one battalion remained. They were led by senior political instructor A. Turovsky. The task of this battalion was to cover the withdrawal of the main forces of the Soviet troops from Smolensk, as well as to simulate the presence of large military formations in the city. Having fulfilled the order, the survivors switched to partisan actions.
Results
In 1941, the Battle of Smolensk was just flaring up, giving the commanders of the Red Army the necessary military experience, without which it would be impossible to fight against such an organized and strong enemy. This confrontation, which lasted 2 months, was the main reason for the failure of Hitler's blitzkrieg plan against the Soviet Union.
The significance of the Smolensk battle can hardly be overestimated. Thanks to superhuman efforts and heroic actions, as well as at the cost of huge losses, the Red Army managed to stop the enemy and go over to the defense of the approaches to Moscow. The Soviet units took the brunt of the German tank group, which they wanted to use to capture the second most important city in the USSR - Leningrad.
The battle of Smolensk, photos of the events of which have survived to this day, showed that a huge number of soldiers and officers, at the cost of their lives, staunchly and selflessly defended literally every meter of their native land. But do not forget about the civilians not only of the city, but also of the region, who provided invaluable assistance in creating defensive positions. About 300 thousand local residents worked here. In addition, they also took part in the hostilities. In the Smolensk region, more than 25 brigades and fighter battalions were formed in a short time.